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Abstract
Joona Räsänen has proposed a concept he calls Schrödinger’s Fetus as a solution to reconciling what he believes are two 
widely held but contradictory intuitions. I show that Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle, upon which Schrödinger’s 
Fetus is based, uses a more convincing account of personhood. I also argue that both Räsänen and Harman, by embracing 
animalism, weaken their arguments by allowing Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion 
into the frame.
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Introduction
Joona Räsänen has recently proposed a concept he calls 
Schrödinger’s Fetus (2019) to further develop and defend 
Elizabeth Harman’s Actual Future Principle (which I will 
refer to as the AFP) (1999). The AFP states that the moral 
status of an early fetus is dependent on its actual future: ‘an 
early fetus that will become a person has some moral status. 
An early fetus that will die while it is still an early fetus has 
no moral status’ (Harman 1999).
Given that the actual future of a given early fetus is uncer-
tain, Räsänen has cleverly captured the indeterminacy of the 
early fetus’ moral status under the AFP with Schrödinger’s 
Fetus, based on Schrödinger’s cat—a quantum mechanics 
thought experiment that involves a cat that is simultane-
ously alive and dead until the state of a radioactive atom is 
observed. Schrödinger’s Fetus similarly has an indeterminate 
moral status—whether the fetus is a person with accompany-
ing moral status cannot be known until the fetus has (or has 
not) gained consciousness.
Harman’s original paper described two contradictory 
intuitions that the AFP is designed to reconcile: that early 
fetuses that die in early abortions lack moral status, and 
that early fetuses that survive to become persons have some 
moral status. According to Räsänen Schrödinger’s Fetus is 
designed for two different contradictory intuitions: first, that 
‘I was once an early fetus’, and second, that ‘early abortion 
does not kill anybody, but prevents someone from coming 
into existence’ (Räsänen 2019).
Here, I show that Harman’s account of personhood is 
more convincing than Räsänen’s account, but given this 
is the only substantial difference between the arguments, 
leaves Schrödinger’s Fetus as offering little more than the 
AFP. I also show both Räsänen’s and Harman’s embrace of 
animalism as an account of personal identity opens the door 
for Don Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ argument against the 
permissibility of abortion (1989), substantially weakening 
their case.
Räsänen’s concept of persons
It is important to note that Räsänen’s argument is subtly 
different to Harman’s AFP. Under the AFP, a fetus that will 
one day become a person has some moral status—it deserves 
some moral consideration because of certain intrinsic prop-
erties it will possess in the future.
Schrödinger’s Fetus, however, is a person—as a fetus—if 
it will go on to become conscious. According to Räsänen, we 
must wait until the fetus has reached consciousness to deter-
mine if it was always a person, implying that he believes 
consciousness is crucial to moral status. However, Räsänen 
seems to be saying that the property of being conscious at 
some point in the future is a sufficient criterion for person-
hood, and this seems problematic. Essentially, it is a claim 
 * Bruce P. Blackshaw 
 bblackshaw@gmail.com
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, 
Birmingham, UK
 B. P. Blackshaw 
1 3
that the (certain) potential for consciousness confers full 
moral status. It is unclear how Räsänen can ground this 
view—it is susceptible to the criticism that he is treating 
a potential X as if it were an actual X without justification. 
This is reminiscent of the substance view of persons, which 
is an account of personhood that regards human beings 
as intrinsically valuable because they are rational moral 
agents by nature (Beckwith 2004). Of course, the substance 
view cannot be utilised by Räsänen, as all early fetuses are 
rational moral persons by nature and considered persons, 
contrary to Schrödinger’s Fetus.
Harman’s approach of assigning some moral value to a 
fetus that becomes a person (whatever the criteria) in the 
future seems far easier to justify than Räsänen’s account, and 
yet without his claim regarding personhood of Schrödinger’s 
Fetus, his account is merely the AFP rebadged.
Räsänen’s intuitions
Räsänen designed Schrödinger’s Fetus to deal with two 
contradictory intuitions that he claims are widely shared. 
The first is that ‘I was once an early fetus’ and it seems 
self-evident that this intuition is broadly accepted. Indeed, 
it is the basis for the account of personal identity known 
as animalism—a view that claims we are animals, and as 
long as our animal functions survive, we survive. Räsänen 
confirms that he is referring to animalism by citing the Too 
Many Thinkers problem, an important defence of animalism 
(Hershenov 2013). On animalism, we come into existence at 
or soon after conception.1 Elizabeth Harman holds a similar 
view, stating that ‘what we are is biological living organ-
isms, with the same criteria of identity we would apply to 
other animals’ (1999).
Räsänen’s second intuition is ‘early abortion does not 
kill anybody, but prevents someone from coming into exist-
ence’ (2019). Contra Räsänen, I am doubtful this is a widely 
held intuition. It certainly contradicts the intuition that I was 
once an early fetus (of course Räsänen agrees, and proposes 
Schrödinger’s Fetus as a solution), but it also seems unlikely 
that a pregnant woman who miscarries consoles herself by 
reasoning that her miscarriage did not involve the death of 
anyone but merely preventing someone from coming into 
existence.
One difficulty with Räsänen’s second intuition is that if 
animalism is accepted—and he certainly seems to accept 
it—early abortion always kills someone, if by ‘someone’ 
we mean an individual human organism. On animalism, 
we have already come into existence by the time of early 
abortion—there is no uncertainty as to the status of our 
existence. Räsänen has confused personal identity with per-
sonhood here—Schrödinger’s Fetus is a person if it goes on 
to become fully conscious, but in terms of personal identity, 
it is always someone, a distinct human being with an iden-
tity, no matter what its future.
I suspect what Räsänen actually means is that ‘early abor-
tion does not kill a person, but prevents that person from 
coming into existence’. If we take this interpretation of 
‘someone’, Schrödinger’s Fetus allows these two intuitions 
to be consistent, given only fetuses that survive to become 
conscious are regarded as persons, and early abortion pre-
vents a fetus from ever being a person.
A future like ours
Further difficulties arise with Räsänen’s reliance on animal-
ism. Indeed, I find it puzzling why Räsänen and Harman 
embrace such an account of personal identity, especially 
since it seems to be less widely accepted than psychologi-
cal accounts of personal identity. They seem to find it a con-
vincing view, but by accepting the intuition that ‘I was once 
an early fetus’, Don Marquis’ influential ‘future like ours’ 
argument comes into play (1989).
According to Marquis, abortion is immoral because it 
deprives a fetus of a future like our future—and to deprive 
us of our futures is immoral. Whether or not a fetus is a per-
son is irrelevant to Marquis—what is important is that when 
a fetus is killed, their future (which is a valuable future as 
eventually they will be a person, like us) is taken away from 
them. A crucial requirement for Marquis’ argument to be 
coherent is that it is the same individual that persists from 
an early fetus to adulthood, otherwise the early fetus would 
not have a future like ours. Of course, this is precisely what 
the intuition that ‘I was once an early fetus’ is claiming, as 
is animalism.
Thus, by embracing animalism, Räsänen introduces a 
severe complication to Schrödinger’s Fetus. Moral status 
aside, he needs to explain why depriving an early fetus of a 
valuable future is not immoral. Given that the usual means of 
doing so is by denying the intuition that ‘I was once an early 
fetus’ and rejecting animalism, it will be difficult to do so.
Harman is aware of this difficulty, stating in a footnote 
that ‘I think we must accept that abortion deprives fetuses 
of possible futures that would be good’ (1999). In her view, 
because aborted fetuses lack moral status under the AFP, 
this is of no moral import. Harman fails to appreciate that 
according to Marquis, abortion is prima facie seriously mor-
ally wrong independently of the moral status of the fetus.
From Räsänen and Harman’s perspective, a far more per-
suasive approach would be to reject animalism in favour of 
a psychological account of personal identity, and reject the 
1 The possibility of twinning in the first 14  days has resulted in 
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intuition that I was once a fetus. This would disarm Mar-
quis’ argument, given that it would entail an individual like 
us does not come into existence until late in the gestation 
period.
Conclusion
When we examine Räsänen’s reasoning for Schrödinger’s 
Fetus, it is wanting. In requiring that the fetus is a person if it 
becomes conscious, his account is treating the certain poten-
tial for consciousness as being the criterion for personhood. 
This is difficult to justify if consciousness itself is the mor-
ally relevant property. Harman’s AFP, which assigns some 
moral status to a fetus that will become a person when it has 
acquired certain intrinsic properties is substantially more 
coherent. However, if Räsänen adopted this view, Schröding-
er’s Fetus is little more than the AFP with a clever name.
Räsänen’s two intuitions that he tries to reconcile via 
Schrödinger’s Fetus also are problematic. The first intuition, 
that I was once an early fetus (shared by Harman), introduces 
a reliance on animalism, while the second, that early abor-
tion kills no-one but prevents someone from coming into 
existence, does not seem widely supported and conflicts with 
animalism irrespective of the moral status of the fetus. More 
importantly, animalism brings Marquis’ ‘future like ours’ 
argument into the frame, and this is difficult to counter if 
animalism is accepted.
A more persuasive approach for both Schrödinger’s Fetus 
and Harman’s AFP would be to deny the intuition that I 
was once a fetus, and reject animalism for a psychological 
account of personal identity.
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